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This paper explores the existence of downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) in 19
OECD countries, over the period 1973–1999, using data for hourly nominal wages at industry
level. Based on a novel nonparametric statistical method, which allows for country and year
speciﬁc variation in both the median and the dispersion of industry wage changes, we reject
the hypothesis of no DNWR. The fraction of wage cuts prevented due to DNWR has fallen
over time, from 70 percent in the 1970s to 11 percent in the late 1990s, but the number of
industries aﬀected by DNWR has increased. DNWR is more prevalent when inﬂation is high,
unemployment is low, union density is high and employment protection legislation is strict.
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In recent years, a number of countries have adopted explicit inﬂation targets for monetary policy,
reﬂecting a general agreement that monetary policy must ensure low inﬂation. The deliberate
policy of low inﬂation has led to renewed interest among academics as well as policy makers
for the contention of Tobin (1972) that if policy aims at too low inﬂation, downward rigidity
of nominal wages (DNWR) may lead to higher wage pressure, involving higher equilibrium un-
employment (see e.g. Akerlof et al., 1996, 2000, Holden, 1994, and Wyplosz, 2001). Other
economists have been less concerned, questioning the existence of DNWR, in particular in low
inﬂation economies (see e.g. Gordon, 1996 and Mankiw, 1996). The issue has also received
considerable attention among policy makers, cf. for example (ECB, 2003, OECD, 2002 and IMF,
2002).
To shed light of this issue, a fast growing body of empirical research has explored the existence
of DNWR in many OECD countries (see references in section 2 below). Almost all of these studies
use various kinds of micro data, mostly of the wage of individual workers, but occasionally also
the wage in speciﬁc jobs in individual ﬁrms. While these studies generally seem to document the
existence of DNWR, a number of key questions are still left unresolved. As the diﬀerent studies
vary considerably concerning both type of data and the methods that are used, it is diﬃcult to
compare the degree of DNWR across countries and the extent to which DNWR has varied over
time. Furthermore, while individual data is necessary to explore whether wages are rigid at
employee level, it will often be unable to answer the question of whether ﬁrms can circumvent
wage rigidity at the individual level. For example, the ﬁrm may change the composition of the
workforce by turnover, or it may refrain from giving wage increases to some workers to save the
loss from being unable to cut wages of other.1 Correspondingly, even if wage rigidity binds in one
ﬁrm, jobs might be shifted over to other ﬁrms where wages are lower, so that the industry eﬀects
1These measures may clearly have other implications, that fall outside the scope of this paper.
2are small. Then DNWR may be less important for macroeconomic performance. It therefore
seems valuable also to investigate DNWR using industry level data.
This paper explores the existence of DNWR in 19 OECD countries, over the period 1973–1999,
using data for hourly nominal earnings at industry level. The study is to be seen as complement-
ary to the large number of micro studies, as it allows for comparisons across diﬀerent groups of
countries, and comparisons over time. More importantly, by using data for the hourly earnings
at industry level, our study captures eﬀects of changes in the composition of the workforce, as
well as the eﬀect of changes in the wage rates. Furthermore, our study covers a number of coun-
tries in Continental Europe, for which there so far is little available evidence of the existence of
DNWR, in spite of the considerable policy importance of this issue in relation to the ambitious
inﬂation target of the ECB. Incidentally, in their discussion of the economic evolution in the euro
area, both the OECD and the IMF are concerned about DNWR, pointing out the lack of empirical
evidence (OECD, 2002 and IMF, 2002). In ECB’s recent evaluation of its monetary policy frame-
work, it is concluded that ‘...the importance in practice of downward nominal rigidities is highly
uncertain and the empirical evidence is not conclusive, particularly for the euro area’ (ECB, 2003,
page 14).
Our paper is also relevant for the recent research on business cycles and monetary policy.
While price rigidities have been a major issue for decades, several recent contributions have
argued that wage stickiness may play a key role (e.g. Erceg et al., 2000, Smets and Wouters, 2003
and Hall, 2005). In this literature, wage and price stickiness are usually implemented without
allowing for possible asymmetry. However, in an era of low inﬂation, it seems important also
to explore whether nominal wages are rigid downwards, as this might exacerbate rigidities in a
downturn of the economy.
To investigate the extent of DNWR, we apply a novel statistical method. The advantage of the
method is that it uses much weaker assumptions than most previous analysis, implying that the
3results should be more robust. First, the method is based on a nonparametric analysis, using data
for hourly earnings only, so that no assumptions concerning explanatory variables or speciﬁc
functional forms are involved. Second, we allow for country and year speciﬁc variation in the
median and the dispersion of wage changes, while most other tests are based on more restrictive
assumptions. Our robustness test nevertheless indicates that the method is able to detect more
than 90 percent of the DNWR that exists in the data.
In addition to investigate the extent of DNWR, we explore potential determinants of DNWR
that are suggested in the theoretical literature. As we have a panel of 19 countries over 27 years,
we are able to explore the eﬀect on DNWR of economic and institutional variables like inﬂation,
unemployment, employment protection legislation, union density, which are often diﬃcult to
evaluate in studies from a single country. Such information is useful as it sheds light on both
possible explanations for DNWR, and on how the extent of DNWR might be aﬀected by economic
policy.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we brieﬂy present the main theoretical
explanations for DNWR, and we refer to related empirical literature. The empirical approach is
laid out in Section 3. In section 4, we document the empirical results on DNWR and discuss the
robustness of our method. In Section 5, we explore the determinants of nominal wage rigidity.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework and related literature
In the literature, two alternative explanations of the existence of DNWR have been proposed. The
most common explanation, advocated by e.g. Blinder and Choi (1990) and Akerlof et al. (1996),
is that employers avoid nominal wage cuts because both they and (in particular) the employees
think that a wage cut is unfair. The other explanation, proposed by MacLeod and Malcomson
(1993) in a individual bargaining framework, and Holden (1994) in a collective agreement frame-
4work, is that nominal wages are given in contracts that can only be changed by mutual consent.
Both these theories predict that nominal wage cuts will be prevented in some, but not all cir-
cumstances. For the purpose of detecting DNWR, there is no need to distinguish between these
two explanations of DNWR, and, as argued by Holden (1994), they are likely to be complement-
ary.2 However, we investigate whether institutional variables can explain the extent of DNWR in
section 5, as predicted by the contract explanation.
Empirical work on DNWR have grown rapidly in recent years, with various types of evid-
ence. Blinder and Choi (1990), Akerlof et al. (1996), Bewley (1999) and Agell and Lundborg
(2003) report results from interviews and surveys of employees and employers. A few papers
document the existence of DNWR on aggregate time-series data, see e.g. Holden (1998), Fortin
and Dumont (2000) and Wyplosz (2001). However, the great majority of studies explores large
micro-data sets, following either of two types of approaches. The ﬁrst type, initiated by the
skewness-location approach of McLaughlin (1994), focuses on the eﬀect of inﬂation on the distri-
bution of wage changes; Christoﬁdes and Leung (2003), Lebow et al. (2003), Nickell and Quintini
(2003) and Elsby (2004) are recent applications. The second type, referred to as the earnings
function approach by Knoppik and Beissinger (2003), adds other explanatory variables that are
usually included in wage equations, see e.g. Fehr and Gotte (2005) and Altonji and Devereux
(2000). Our study is of the ﬁrst type, thus a brief discussion of this method is warranted. As
is well known (see e.g. discussion in Knoppik and Beissinger, 2003 or Nickell and Quintini,
2003), the validity of variants of this type of approach rests on various restrictive assumptions
concerning the notional distribution of wage changes, i.e. the wage changes that would prevail
in the absence of DNWR, following the terminology of Akerlof et al. (1996). The LSW statistic,
suggested by Lebow et al. (1995), requires that the notional distribution is symmetric. The Kahn
test (Kahn, 1997) allows for asymmetry of the notional wage change distribution, as long as the
2Eﬃciency wage theories and insider-outsider theories are also sometimes mentioned as explanations of DNWR,
but these theories explain real wage rigidity and need additional assumptions to generate DNWR.
5shape of the notional distribution is invariant to inﬂation, i.e. the only eﬀect of inﬂation on the
distribution of wage changes comes in the form of DNWR. As illustrated in Figure 2 below, the
wage change distribution is asymmetric in our data, and dispersion changes over time (as does
inﬂation), so both these methods are problematic in our case. The Nickell and Quintini (2003)
method is based on the assumption (or approximation) that the probability of a nominal wage
cut is a quadratic function of the median wage change. As will become apparent below, we
construct the notional wage change distribution based on the wage change observations in the
high inﬂation years 1973–92, assuming the same shape of the notional distribution in all country
year samples, but allowing for country year variation in the median and the dispersion of wage
changes.
In general these studies document that nominal wages are rigid downwards. However, with
the exception of Dessy (2002), diﬀerent methods and data in the above-mentioned studies make
it in general diﬃcult to compare the degree of downward nominal wage rigidity across countries.3
3 Empirical approach
We use an unbalanced panel of industry level data for the annual percentage growth of gross
hourly earnings for manual workers from the manufacturing, mining and quarrying, electricity,
gas and water supply, and construction sectors of 19 OECD countries in the period 1973–1999.
The countries included in the sample are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Denmark, Spain,
Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Por-
tugal, Sweden, the UK and the US. The main data source for wages are harmonized hourly
earnings from Eurostat and wages in manufacturing from ILO.4 One observation is thus denoted
∆wjit where j is index for industry, i is index for country and t is index for year. There are all
3The International Wage Flexibility Project, organised by William Dickens and Erica Groshen, may change that,
as it comprises studies on comparable micro data for many OECD countries.
4The data for Austria, Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Sweden and the US are from the ILO, while the data for
Norway is from Statistics Norway. The data from the other countries are from Eurostat.
6together 9509 observations distributed across 449 country-year samples, on average 21 industries
per country-year. More details on the data are provided in the appendix.
As most other studies of DNWR use micro data, it is useful to discuss the diﬀerence between
DNWR at individual versus industry level. The average wage growth in an industry can be
decomposed into two parts: the average wage growth for job stayers, and the eﬀects of composi-
tional changes, where the wages of new workers diﬀer from the wages of those who leave. As to
the former component, considering the average wage growth rather than for a single person will
tend to reduce the incidence of nominal wage cuts (given that the economy-wide wage change is
positive), as the average wage change has a lower variance than individual wage changes. The
latter component – compositional changes – may be positive or negative, so the eﬀect on the
incidence of nominal wage cuts is ambiguous. Nevertheless, if DNWR prevents wage cuts for
some workers, without aﬀecting the wage for others, there will be an eﬀect on average industry
wages that we may detect in our data. Yet the fact that our data are based on the average of
many workers, and are aﬀected by compositional changes, will reduce our ability to detect the
impact of individual DNWR, as these eﬀects may be seen as ‘noise’ relative to individual DNWR.
Thus, we are likely to detect less DNWR than one usually ﬁnds in micro data. However, as these
eﬀects are not related to inﬂation, they will not cause a deﬁcit in the wage change distribution
that depends on inﬂation. In other words, these eﬀects will not lead to us to ﬁnd DNWR that is
not caused by DNWR at the individual level. (In section 4 below, we undertake robustness checks
to substantiate this claim.)
Note also that if ﬁrms respond to individual DNWR by exploiting other ‘avenues of ﬂexibility’,
for example by giving lower wage growth to other workers, or changing the composition of the
workforce, then individual DNWR will have less or no impact on average industry wages. In this
case we will not ﬁnd any DNWR. Yet in this situation one may argue that the individual DNWR
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Figure 1: The number of wage cuts over time.
costs by other means.
A further aspect is that in most micro studies, a nominal wage cut is understood as a reduction
in hourly nominal pay for a job stayer. This may lead to biased estimates due to self selection, if
employees quit if their wage is cut, implying that they no longer are job stayers.5 In contrast, to
the extent that such behaviour aﬀects average industry wages, and thus aﬀects our results, it is not
a bias, as it would reﬂect a real impact on ﬁrms’ wage costs. Micro data studies have, however, an
advantage in a much larger number of observations, with the possibility of controlling for other
explanatory variables. Overall, it seems worthwhile to explore DNWR with both types of data.
There are no nominal wage cuts in 331 (74%) of the country-year samples. In our data we
observe, however, no less than Y = 324 events of nominal wage cuts, i.e. 3.4 percent of all
observations. There were fewer wage cuts in the 1970s, early 1980s and early 1990s, while most
wage cuts occurred after 1992, cf. Figure 1. Table A1 in the data appendix reports the distribution
of wage cuts and observations across countries and years.
As an illustration Figure 2 displays box plots of annual wage changes in Portugal, as well as
a histogram of the wage changes in 29 industries in Portugal in 1998. We see that the average
and the dispersion of wage growth vary over time, with a falling trend. The histogram for 1998
seems consistent with the idea that DNWR has prevented some nominal wage cuts, compressing
5Assuming that the higher wage of the job quitter does not reﬂect higher productivity, which seems reasonable in
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Figure 2: Box plots of annual wage growth in Portugal (left) and histogram of annual wage growth in 1998 (right). The
box plot illustrates the distribution of wage changes within a country-year. The box extends from the 25th to the 75th
percentile with the median inside the box. The whiskers emerging from the box indicate the tails of the distributions and
the dots represent outliers.
the empirical wage change distribution relative to the notional by pushing the left tail to positive
values. However, to evaluate this hypothesis properly, we need to use a formal statistical method.
To detect whether the empirical distribution is compressed relative to the notional distribution
(i.e. without DNWR), we must specify the notional distribution, as well as compare the notional
distribution with the empirical outcomes. We construct the shape of the notional distribution on
the basis of all observations for the high inﬂation period 1973–1992, assuming the same shape
in all country-years, except that we allow for the median and dispersion to diﬀer across country-
year samples. Thus, our assumptions are less restrictive than the Kahn test which would be
biased in our sample, due to the fact that both dispersion and inﬂation fall over time. The
constructed shape may also be aﬀected by DNWR, but this eﬀect should be small given that we
only use observations from the high-inﬂation years where DNWR is less likely to be binding.
Alternatively, we could have assumed that the notional distribution was normal. However, as
illustrated in Figure 3 below, this would not be a good approximation.
To compare the notional distributions with the empirical outcomes, we simulate all country-
year samples based on the notional distributions, and count the number of wage cuts in the
simulations. If the empirical outcomes were aﬀected by DNWR, the simulations based on the
9notional distributions will involve a higher number of wage cuts than what actually took place.
If this diﬀerence is suﬃciently large (which will be made more precise below), we conclude that
DNWR has been binding in some country-year samples. In the next section, our test is presented
more formally.
3.1 The formal test
As mentioned above, our test is based on the assumption that the shape of the wage change
distribution is the same (in the absence of possible DNWR) in all country-year samples, except
that the median and dispersion may vary among country-year samples. To ensure robustness to
DNWR and outliers, we follow Nickell and Quintini (2003) and measure dispersion by the range
between the 75th and the 35th percentiles, rather than the standard deviation. Using the 35th
percentile as the lower range reduces the risk that it is aﬀected by DNWR. For the same reasons,
we use the median rather than the mean. Under these assumptions, we construct an underlying
distribution of wage changes based on the sample of 7117 empirical wage change observations
for the high inﬂation period 1973–92, where the empirical wage changes are normalised with







, s = 1,...,7117 (1)
For simplicity we use subscript s which runs over all j, i and t = 1973,...,1992. The left panel
of Figure 3 compares the underlying distribution of wage changes with the standard normal
distribution; we notice that the underlying distribution is skewed with the mean at 2.9 percent.
The country-year speciﬁc distribution of notional wage changes are calculated on the basis
of the underlying wage changes, ∆wn
s , adjusting for the country-year speciﬁc median and inter
percentile range. The right panel of Figure 3 compares the empirical distribution for Portugal
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Figure 3: Left: Histogram of the normalised underlying distribution of wage changes and the normal density (solid
line). 79 extreme observations are omitted. Right: Histogram of observed wage changes and the notional wage change
distribution in Portugal 1998.
justment for the empirical median and dispersion in Portugal in 1998). Thus, by construction
the notional distribution and the empirical histogram have identical median and inter percentile
range, but the shapes diﬀer, as the notional distribution is based on the shape of the normalised
underlying distribution illustrated to the left in Figure 3. We observe that the country-speciﬁc
notional distribution indicates a considerable probability of negative wage changes, in contrast
to the empirical outcome.
One complication is that the empirical samples, as well as the moments based on them, are
stochastic and thus burdened with unknown uncertainty. To allow for that, we use a bootstrap
method. More speciﬁcally, for each of the 449 country-year samples, we
• bootstrap the empirical wage changes (for example, in a country-year with 24 observations,
we make 24 random draws from the empirical sample of 24 industry wage changes, with
replacement),
• count the number of bootstrapped wage cuts in the country-year, yB
it,
• calculate the country-speciﬁc bootstrapped median, µB




11• construct the country-year speciﬁc distribution of notional wage changes by adjusting the
underlying wage change distribution for the country-speciﬁc bootstrapped median and the
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• calculate the corresponding country-year speciﬁc probability of a notional wage cut in
country-year it as the incidence of notional wage cuts out of the total sample of notional





, s = 1,...,7117 (3)
• simulate the number of notional wage cuts in each country-year speciﬁc sample, b yit, by
drawing from a binomial distribution using the country-speciﬁc notional probabilities ˜ qit.
We then compare the total number of bootstrapped wage cuts yB =
P
it yB
it for all 449 country-
year samples with the total number of simulated notional wage cuts, b y =
P
it b yit. If the empirical
samples are aﬀected by DNWR, there will be a tendency that there are more simulated wage
cuts than bootstrapped wage cuts, i.e. b y > yB. We therefore repeat this procedure 5000 times,
undertaking a new bootstrap for each country-year sample each time, and count the number
of times where b y > yB (denoted #(b y > yB)). The null hypothesis is rejected with a level of
signiﬁcance at 5 percent if 1 − #(b y > yB)/5000 ≤ 0.05.
Given our assumption that the shape of the notional wage change distributions is the same in
all country-year samples, while the median wage growth and dispersion may vary, constructing
the underlying wage change distribution by use of 7117 observations should ensure a high degree
of accuracy in our notional country-speciﬁc distributions. Furthermore, 5000 simulations will
ensure a close approximation to the distribution of the total number of wage cuts if there were no
12DNWR.6 Thus, the signiﬁcance level of our test should be reliable. However, if DNWR is at work
in some country-year samples that are used in constructing the underlying wage change distri-
bution, the underlying and notional wage change distribution will be compressed, as these are
based on the empirical distributions for all country-year samples. Likewise, if DNWR compresses
the inter percentile range in certain country year samples, the associated notional country year
speciﬁc distribution will also be compressed. Thus, in these cases the notional probabilities will
be biased downwards, reducing the number of simulated wage cuts. This will reduce the power
of our test.However, under H0, there is no DNWR, and thus no downward bias. Hence this aspect
will not aﬀect the signiﬁcance level of our test.
4 Results
There are more simulated than bootstrapped wage cuts in all 5000 simulations. Thus we reject
the null hypothesis comfortably with a p-value of 0, and we may conclude that DNWR has been
at work in our sample. To illustrate the power of the test we plot the histograms of the number
of simulated and bootstrapped wage cuts in Figure 4. The distribution of the simulated wage
cuts are almost entirely to the right of the distribution of the bootstrapped cuts. On average, we
simulate b Y = 417.0 notional wage cuts and bootstrap 324 wage cuts (due to the large number of
simulations, the bootstrapped average of 324 clearly equals the number of observed wage cuts,
Y). The average fraction of notional wage cuts that is prevented by DNWR, may be expressed by
(1−Y/b Y) which for the whole sample yields (1−324/417) = 0.22. Thus, a bit more than one out of
ﬁve notional wage cuts does not result in an observed wage cut due to DNWR. Another measure
which illustrates the economic signiﬁcance of DNWR, is the average fraction of industry-years
aﬀected by DNWR. This fraction is an estimate of the probability than an observation is aﬀected
6Given the notional country-year speciﬁc distributions it would in principle be straightforward to calculate the
probability distribution function for the total number of wage cuts by use of a formulae for draws from multinomial
distributions. However, with 9509 observations, drawn from diﬀerent binomial distributions, this is computationally
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Figure 4: The frequency distributions of the number of 5000 bootstrapped (empirical) and simulated (notional) wage
cuts.
Table 1: Results from 5000 simulations on subperiods.
Sample properties: 1973–1979 1980–1989 1990–1994 1995–1999
No. of observations (S) 2224 3717 1906 1662
No. of country-years 109 175 88 77
Average wage growth 13.78% 8.72% 5.60% 3.99%
Average inﬂation rate 10.30% 8.13% 4.42% 2.19%
Average unemployment rate 3.71% 6.72% 8.49% 8.07%
Observed wage cuts (Y) 5 74 93 152
Incidence of wage cuts (Y/S) 0.0023 0.0199 0.0488 0.0915
Simulation results:
Average simulated wage cuts (b Y) 16.7 112.8 116.0 171.5
#(b y > yB) 4973 4992 4794 4502
Probability of signiﬁcance (p) 0.005 0.002 0.041 0.100
Fraction of wage cuts prevented (FWCP) 0.698 0.346 0.199 0.113
Fraction of industry-years aﬀected (FIYA) 0.005 0.010 0.012 0.012
Note: #(b y > yB) is the number of simulations where we simulate more wage cuts than we bootstrap. FWCP = 1−Y/b Y.
FIYA = (b Y − Y)/S.
by DNWR and may be calculated by (b Y − Y)/S where S is the total number of industry-year
observations. For the whole sample the fraction is (417 − 324)/9509 = 0.010.
A number of interesting questions arise. Is there evidence for DNWR for diﬀerent time peri-
ods, regions and countries? To what extent is DNWR related to labour market institutions as
proposed by theory? We ﬁrst investigate whether DNWR has changed over time by splitting the
sample into four subperiods 1973–1979, 1980–1989, 1990–1994 and 1995–1999, see Table 1.
There is evidence of DNWR in all periods although only at the ten percent level in the latter
14period. In the high-inﬂation 1970s, the fraction of wage cuts prevented was 70 percent. In the
1980s, it had fallen to 35 percent, and then further to 20 percent in the early 1990s. In the late
1990s, the fraction of wage cuts prevented was 11 percent. However, as nominal wage growth
has fallen in line with inﬂation, the number of industry-years aﬀected by DNWR has increased
from 0.5 percent in the 1970s, to 1.0 percent in the 1980s and 1.2 percent in the 1990s.
To investigate whether the change in DNWR over time is signiﬁcant, we undertake Poisson
regressions with the number of observed wage cuts in each country-year sample, Yit, as the
dependent variable, and normalise on the average number of simulated wage cuts for country-
year sample, b Yit. A Poisson regression seems appropriate as the endogenous variable is based on
count data, see Cameron and Trivedi (1998). Adding a time trend, we obtain a trend coeﬃcient
of 0.037, which is signiﬁcant at the one percent level. Thus, the ratio of observed to simulated
wage cuts has increased over time, implying that we can conclude that DNWR as measured by the
fraction of wage cuts prevented, has fallen over time. Furthermore, we also regress the country-
year observations of the fraction of industry-years aﬀected, (b Yit − Yit)/Sit on a time trend (now
using OLS, as a Poisson regression is not feasible when some observations are negative). We ﬁnd
a trend coeﬃcient of 0.013 which is signiﬁcantly positive at the one percent level, indicating that
the number of industries aﬀected by DNWR has increased over time.
We then split the sample into four groups or regions; Anglo (Canada, Ireland, New Zealand,
the UK and the US), Core (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Nether-
lands), Nordic (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) and South (Italy, Greece, Portugal and
Spain), cf. results in columns 2–5 in Table 2.
We ﬁnd signiﬁcant DNWR at the one percent level for the Core and Nordic regions, at ﬁve
percent for the South, and at the ten percent level for the Anglo group. The fraction of wage cuts
prevented is high in two regions, 49 percent in the Nordic countries and 41 percent in the South.
In the Anglo and Core groups, the fraction of wage cuts prevented is considerably lower, 13 and
15Table 2: Results from 5000 simulations on regions.
Sample properties: All regions Anglo Core Nordic South
No. of observations (S) 9509 2961 3110 1976 1462
No. of country-years 449 129 158 95 67
Observed wage cuts (Y) 324 153 125 18 28
Incidence of wage cuts (Y/S) 0.0341 0.0517 0.0402 0.0091 0.0192
Simulation results:
Average simulated wage cuts (b Y) 417.0 176.6 158.6 34.7 47.1
#(b y > yB) 5000 4621 4948 4948 4921
Probability of signiﬁcance 0 0.076 0.010 0.010 0.016
Fraction of wage cuts prevented (FWCP) 0.223 0.134 0.211 0.493 0.405
Fraction of industry-years aﬀected (FIYA) 0.010 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.013
21 percent respectively. This diﬀerence is roughly in line with what one would expect in view of
the diﬀerences in labour market institutions. Based on a theoretical framework allowing for bar-
gaining over collective agreements as well as individual bargaining, Holden (2004) argues that
workers who have their wage set via unions or collective agreements have stronger protection
against a nominal wage cut, thus the extent of DNWR is likely to be increasing in the coverage of
collective agreements and in union density. For non-union workers, the strictness of the employ-
ment protection legislation (EPL) is key to their possibility of avoiding a nominal wage cut. Thus,
one would expect considerable rigidity in the Nordic countries, where both union density and
bargaining coverage are high, while EPL is fairly strict (with the exception of Denmark) (in the
appendix, we report country-speciﬁc indices for labour market institutions). One would also ex-
pect considerable rigidity in southern Europe, as EPL is very strict and bargaining coverage fairly
high, even if union density is on the low side. In the Core region, even if bargaining coverage is
fairly high, and EPL fairly strict, union density is lower than in the Nordic countries, and EPL is
less strict than in the South, so one would expect some, but weaker DNWR. Finally, in the Anglo
countries, density is lower and EPL weaker than in the other regions, so this is where one would
expect the weakest DNWR.
Splitting the sample by combining the regions and the sub-periods implies a smaller number
of observations behind each test statistic, and as expected this reduces the signiﬁcance levels, see
16Table 3: Results from 5000 simulations on regions and sub-periods.
Region 1973–1979 1980–1989 1990–1994 1995–1999
No. of observations 698 1149 595 519
No. of country-years 31 50 25 23
Anglo Observed wage cuts 0 26 59 68
Incidence of wage cuts 0 0.0226 0.0992 0.1310
Average simulated wage cuts 3.2 42.0 67.0 64.4
#(b y > yB) 4742 4861 3866 1607
Probability of signiﬁcance 0.052 0.028 0.227 0.679
Fraction of wage cuts prevented 1 0.385 0.120 0
Fraction of industry-years aﬀected 0.005 0.014 0.014 0
No. of observations 794 1183 587 546
No. of country-years 41 60 30 27
Observed wage cuts 4 40 18 63
Core Incidence of wage cuts 0.0050 0.0338 0.0307 0.1154
Average simulated wage cuts 9.4 53.7 23.6 71.8
#(b y > yB) 4506 4631 4105 4162
Probability of signiﬁcance 0.099 0.074 0.179 0.168
Fraction of wage cuts prevented 0.571 0.256 0.240 0.122
Fraction of industry-years aﬀected 0.007 0.012 0.010 0.016
No. of observations 474 888 354 260
No. of country-years 23 40 18 14
Observed wage cuts 1 3 12 2
Nordic Incidence of wage cuts 0.0021 0.0034 0.0339 0.0077
Average simulated wage cuts 2.1 8.4 16.2 8.0
#(b y > yB) 3017 4633 3918 4778
Probability of signiﬁcance 0.397 0.073 0.216 0.044
Fraction of wage cuts prevented 0.521 0.643 0.265 0.750
Fraction of industry-years aﬀected 0.002 0.006 0.012 0.023
No. of observations 258 497 370 337
No. of country-years 14 25 15 13
Observed wage cuts 0 5 4 19
South Incidence of wage cuts 0 0.0101 0.0108 0.0564
Average simulated wage cuts 2.0 8.7 9.1 27.3
#(b y > yB) 4159 3947 4398 4352
Probability of signiﬁcance 0.168 0.211 0.120 0.130
Fraction of wage cuts prevented 1 0.425 0.559 0.304
Fraction of industry-years aﬀected 0.008 0.007 0.014 0.025
Table 3. Thus, these results should be treated more cautiously. It is nevertheless an interesting
feature that the fraction of wage cuts prevented increased in the late 1990s in the Nordic countries,
in contrast to the consistent reduction over time in the other three regions. The fraction of
industry-years aﬀected by DNWR has increased the Nordic region and the South, with a more
mixed picture in the Anglo and the Core.
In Table 4, we report the results concerning individual countries. As these results are also
17Table 4: Results from 5000 simulations on countries.
Country S T Y Y/S b Y #(b y > yB) p FWCP FIYA
Austria 408 26 2 0.0049 7.3 4732 0.054 0.729 0.013
Belgium 575 26 31 0.0539 40.9 4672 0.066 0.243 0.017
Canada 627 26 57 0.0909 57.2 2410 0.518 0.004 0.000
Denmark 462 24 8 0.0172 13.4 4222 0.156 0.405 0.012
Finland 368 23 2 0.0054 5.8 4404 0.119 0.658 0.010
France 556 26 21 0.0378 18.0 1252 0.750 0 0
Germany 665 26 16 0.0241 16.9 2586 0.483 0.052 0.001
Greece 469 26 7 0.0149 7.2 2257 0.549 0.026 0.000
Ireland 463 23 27 0.0583 35.2 4228 0.154 0.235 0.018
Italy 312 13 0 0 3.1 4663 0.067 1 0.010
Luxembourg 423 27 32 0.0757 40.5 4282 0.154 0.235 0.018
Netherlands 483 27 23 0.0476 34.9 4803 0.039 0.341 0.025
New Zealand 750 27 45 0.0600 54.3 4121 0.176 0.171 0.012
Norway 674 27 2 0.0030 4.1 3585 0.283 0.510 0.003
Portugal 411 18 3 0.0073 20.4 4999 0.000 0.853 0.042
Spain 270 10 18 0.0667 16.4 1709 0.658 0 0
Sweden 472 21 6 0.0127 11.4 4586 0.083 0.478 0.012
UK 615 26 18 0.0293 21.5 3671 0.266 0.168 0.006
US 506 27 6 0.0119 8.4 3389 0.322 0.278 0.006
Note: T is the number of years. p is the probability of signiﬁcance. FWCP and FIYA are set to zero for
France and Spain, where we simulate less wage cuts than we observe.
based on fewer observations, and signiﬁcance levels are lower, the results can only be viewed as
indicative. However, DNWR is signiﬁcant for the Netherlands and Portugal at the ﬁve percent
level, and Austria, Belgium, Italy, and Sweden at the ten percent level. We observe that for
all countries except Canada, France and Spain, the simulations indicate some DNWR, as some
notional wage cuts are prevented. It is also noteworthy that the fraction of wage cuts prevented
is above 40 percent for all the Nordic countries. A surprising feature is that the South splits in
two, with strong DNWR in Portugal and Italy, and no or negligible DNWR in Spain and Greece.
The fraction of industry-years aﬀected by DNWR varies from 4.2 percent (Portugal) at the top, to
0 percent (Canada, France and Spain) at the bottom.
To explore the precision of our measures of DNWR, we undertake Poisson regressions with
the number of observed wage cuts in each country-year sample, Yit, as the dependent variable,
normalising on the number of simulated wage cuts, b Yit, and adding dummies for region, period,
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Figure 5: Estimated fractions of wage cuts prevented with 95% conﬁdence intervals.
dummies we derive conﬁdence intervals for the fraction of wage cuts prevented for all the respect-
ive subsamples, see Figure 5.7 The conﬁdence intervals are fairly large, and with few exceptions,
we are not able to conclude that the fractions are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one another. The
large uncertainty reﬂects that for many countries, there are few notional wage cuts. This implies
that the fraction of wage cuts prevented is very sensitive even to a marginal change in the number
of realised wage cuts. Norway is an extreme case, with only 4.1 notional wage cuts; here, two
observed wage cuts leads to a fraction of wage cuts prevented of 0.51.
In view of the large uncertainty one should be careful when interpreting the diﬀerences
between the countries. Nevertheless the estimates may be useful as a benchmark when com-
7The Poisson regression yields predicted values for Y/b Y from which estimates for FWCP = 1 − Y/b Y follow
directly. Note also that the point estimates of the fractions in Figure 5 diﬀer slightly from the fractions in the tables, as
the former are based on the Poisson regressions, and thus are non-linear, while the latter are linear averages based on
the simulations.
19paring estimates from micro studies from diﬀerent countries. Generally, we ﬁnd less signiﬁcant
evidence for DNWR than previous studies on micro data, but with a rough correspondence when
it comes to country diﬀerences. For example, Ekberg (2004) documents considerable DNWR
in Sweden, while Biscourp et al. (2004) ﬁnd that wages are ﬂexible downwards in France, both
results consistent with our point estimates. Our ﬁnding of strong DNWR for Portugal is consist-
ent with the institutional feature that a nominal wage cut for a job stayer is illegal in Portugal.
However, for several other countries, speciﬁcally the US, Germany and the UK, we detect no
signiﬁcant dnwr, in contrast to recent micro data evidence. For the US, Lebow et al. (2003)
document DNWR in the BLS’s employment cost index, with the fraction of wage cuts prevented
estimated to about one half. Bauer et al. (2003) and Knoppik and Beissinger (2003) ﬁnd signiﬁc-
ant DNWR for Germany, the latter estimating the fraction of wage cuts prevented to 70 percent
for wage earners, while Elsby (2004) and Nickell and Quintini (2003) document DNWR for the
UK.
As discussed in section 3 above, we would expect to ﬁnd weaker evidence of DNWR than in
micro studies, both because our wage data are aﬀected by compositional changes that may be
unrelated to DNWR, and because ﬁrms may exploit other ‘avenues’ for ﬂexibility to circumvent
rigidity at the individual level. Seen in this light, our evidence of DNWR yields clear additional
support to the idea that DNWR does aﬀect ﬁrms’ wage costs in many European countries, even if
the quantitative eﬀect seem moderate.
4.1 Robustness
In this section we explore the robustness of our ﬁndings. One possible questionable assumption
so far is whether the shape of the wage change distribution is the same in all countries and over
time. Thus, in the appendix, we also report results based on country-speciﬁc and period-speciﬁc
underlying distributions. More precisely, we construct separate underlying distributions ∆wn
s
20for each country, alternatively for each period, and then proceed with the bootstrap method as
before. Because the underlying distributions are based on fewer observations one would expect
this method to be more vulnerable to a downward bias by DNWR compressing the underly-
ing and notional distributions. As shown in the appendix, the qualitative results are similar to
those reported above; somewhat weaker evidence of DNWR with country-speciﬁc distributions,
and somewhat stronger evidence with period-speciﬁc distributions. However, it is worth noting
that with country-speciﬁc underlying distributions, the point estimates suggest that there is some
DNWR in all countries except the US (but again, there is large uncertainty).
A more fundamental question is to what extent our ﬁndings have anything to do with DNWR
at all, or whether they just reﬂect other speciﬁc distributional aspects. We address this question
in three diﬀerent ways. First, we ‘contaminate’ our data by adding additional DNWR for a selec-
ted number of countries, and explore how this aﬀects our ﬁndings. More precisely, we pick ten
countries evenly from the four regions (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and the US), and by random selection we eliminate half of the nominal
wage cuts in each country by setting the associated nominal wage change to zero, thereby redu-
cing the number of wage cuts from 324 to 238. Due to integer problems, we in practice eliminate
48 percent of the nominal wage cuts (in Portugal we eliminate one out of three observed wage
cuts). Again, we apply our procedure with the contaminated data. With a perfect method, this
would reduce the fraction of wage cuts realised (which is equal to one minus the fraction of wage
cuts prevented) by on average 48 percent in these countries, without aﬀecting the fraction of
wage cuts realised in the other countries. The results are promising. For the aﬀected countries,
the average fraction of wage cuts realised is reduced by 44 percent, as compared to the original
results, see Table 5. Taken at face value, these results suggest that our method on average is able
to detect 92 percent of the total DNWR in the data (calculated as the computed reduction of 44
percent as compared to the constructed reduction of 48 percent, where 44/48 = 0.92). The vari-
21Table 5: The eﬀect from adding DNWR on the fraction on realised wage cuts.
Countries without additional DNWR Countries with additional DNWR
∆Y ∆FWCR ∆Y ∆FWCR
Austria 0.000 0.004 Belgium –0.484 –0.376
Italy 0.000 0.000 Canada –0.491 –0.466
Luxembourg 0.000 0.011 Denmark –0.500 –0.492
Netherlands 0.000 0.009 Finland –0.500 –0.474
New Zealand 0.000 0.005 France –0.476 –0.424
Norway 0.000 0.033 Germany –0.500 –0.484
Spain 0.000 0.012 Greece –0.429 –0.415
Sweden 0.000 0.029 Ireland –0.481 –0.475
UK 0.000 0.001 Portugal –0.333 –0.327
US –0.500 –0.483
Notes:∆Y is the relative change in the number of nominal wage cuts. ∆FWCR is the diﬀerence in the fraction of wage
cuts realised.
ation among the ten countries is fairly small, varying from a minimum of 37.6/48.4 = 78 percent
for Belgium to a maximum of 47.5/48.1 = 99 percent for Ireland. For the other countries, the
fraction of wage cuts realised is hardly aﬀected (on average, it increases by one percent, with
a maximum of three percent for Norway). The fact that we detect less than 100 percent of the
additional DNWR is consistent with the downward bias in the estimated DNWR due to DNWR
aﬀecting the notional distribution, as discussed in section 3.1 above.
Secondly, we explore whether our ﬁndings can be caused by downward real wage rigidity
(DRWR), that workers for various reasons resist a reduction in their real wages. Bauer et al.
(2003) and Barwell and Schweitzer (2004) ﬁnd evidence for DRWR in Germany and the UK,
respectively. Furthermore, Bauer et al. (2003) point out that by not allowing for DRWR, there
is a risk that the extent of DNWR is overestimated. In our data, however, almost 30 percent of
all observations are negative real wage changes, by itself a clear sign that if DRWR exists, it is
certainly not absolute.
The quantitative eﬀect of DRWR on our method is not clear. While DRWR clearly will reduce
the number of nominal wage cuts when inﬂation is low, it will also aﬀect the shape of the under-
lying notional distribution. To explore the quantitative impact, we add DRWR to our data set by
randomly eliminating 20 percent of all observations of real wage cuts (i.e. 618 observations) by
22setting the associated nominal wage change equal to the rate of inﬂation. This reduces the total
number of nominal wage cuts by 18 percent, from 324 to 265, with potentially strong impact on
any ﬁndings of DNWR. However, applying our method with the manipulated data, it turns out
that our measure of DNWR is not much aﬀected: Eliminating real wage cuts involves a compres-
sion of the notional wage change distributions, implying that the overall fraction of wage cuts
prevented increases by only six percentage points (from 22 to 28 percent). Thus, we conclude
that while DRWR may have aﬀected our results, it seems unlikely that the eﬀect is large, in view
of the fact that a fairly strong DRWR of 20 percent had a rather limited impact on our results.
Thirdly, we explore whether our results are caused by compositional changes arising from
a diﬀerence between the wages of new and former workers. Such compositional changes will
constitute an additional random component, which may be positive or negative. As a crude
illustration of the eﬀect, we add a normally distributed term to our wage data, with zero mean and
standard deviation one percent (arbitrarily chosen, but it suﬃces for illustration). As expected,
applying our analysis on these data leads to both more observed and more simulated wage cuts,
reducing the overall fraction of wage cuts prevented from 0.22 in the original data to 0.19 with
the contaminated data. We conclude that compositional changes cannot explain our ﬁndings of
DNWR; rather, it is likely to weaken our ﬁndings.
5 Explaining the number of wage cuts
While the previous analysis documents the existence of DNWR, it does not investigate explicitly
whether the incidence of nominal wage cuts depends on economic and institutional variables.
As mentioned above, Holden (2004) shows that DNWR is likely to depend on inﬂation in a
non-linear way, as well as on institutional variables like EPL and union density or bargaining
coverage. Furthermore, high unemployment may also weaken workers’ resistance to nominal
wage cuts. Thus, we apply a Poisson regression model of the number of wage cuts in each
23country-year sample, Yit, as the dependent variable (i.e. 449 observations) and with a number of
explanatory variables including inﬂation and inﬂation squared, an index of EPL, union density,
the unemployment rate. We do the analysis in two diﬀerent ways. First, we normalise on the
number of industries in the country-year sample, Sit, i.e. we explain the incidence of wage
cuts. Second, we normalise on the average number of simulated wage cuts, b Yit, i.e. we explain
the fraction of simulated wage cuts that are actually realised. Adding institutional variables as
regressors, we can then test directly whether these variables lead to fewer observed than notional
wage cuts, i.e. to DNWR.
The conditional density in a Poisson model is









where E(Yit | xit) = λit, xit represents the explanatory variables and β is the parameter vector. In
the Poisson model the variance is equal to the mean. However, data are often characterised by
‘overdispersion’ and hence at odds with the Poisson assumption. Undertaking the Poisson regres-
sion of Yit/Sit, a goodness-of ﬁt test formally rejects the hypothesis that the data are generated
according to the Poisson regression model (χ2(416) = 634.6). We therefore use a negative bino-
mial regression model, which allows for overdispersion and can be seen as a generalisation of
the Poisson model. Speciﬁcally, we use two alternative speciﬁcations for the Poisson parameter:
lnλit = x0
itβ + εit, εit ∼ Γ(1,δ) (5’)
lnλit = x0
itβ + εit, εit ∼ Γ(1,φie−αi) (5”)
Including a Gamma distributed error term, εit, in (5’) and (5”) allows the variance to mean ratios
24Table 6: Maximum likelihood estimates with standard errors in parenthesis from negative binomial regressions in columns
one and two and from Poisson regressions in columns three and four.
Incidence of wage cuts Fraction of wage cuts realised
Pooled Fixed eﬀects Pooled Fixed eﬀects
Ln(Sit) 1 (–) 1 (–) – –
Ln(Simulated cuts) – – 1 (–) 1 (–)
EPL −0.310∗ (0.104) −0.785∗ (0.200) −0.126∗ (0.058) −0.355 (0.288)
Union density −0.803 (0.598) −1.992∗ (0.980) −0.890∗ (0.371) −1.790 (1.388)
Inﬂation −0.484∗ (0.073) −0.345∗ (0.062) −0.088 (0.047) −0.044 (0.061)
Inﬂation squared 0.016∗ (0.003) 0.011∗ (0.003) 0.003 (0.002) −0.002 (0.003)
Unemployment 0.116∗ (0.029) 0.092∗ (0.036) 0.032∗ (0.015) 0.007 (0.034)
constant 1.092∗ (0.463) 1.855∗ (0.762) 0.208 (0.242) —
log-likelihood –364.6 –288.5 –261.4 –215.0
Number of observations 422 409 422 409
Notes: (i) Sit is the number of industries in country-year sample it. (ii) ∗ indicates signiﬁcance at 5% level.
(iii) Luxembourg is not included because of lack of EPL data. In addition, Italy is excluded from the ﬁxed eﬀects
models as there are no observed wage cuts in this country.
of Yit to be larger than unity. (4) and (5’) together yield the pooled negative binomial regression
model. In (5”), we also include a country speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect, αi, to allow for a country speciﬁc
variance to mean ratio, see Hausman et al. (1984) for details.
The results of the negative binomial model (where we explain the incidence of wage cuts) are
presented in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 6. In accordance with the theoretical predictions, EPL,
union density and inﬂation, all have a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on the incidence of nominal wage
cuts, although union density is not signiﬁcant in the pooled speciﬁcation. High unemployment
increases the incidence of wage cuts.
The quantitative impact of the institutional variables is fairly large, even if the eﬀects dif-
fer according to the method applied. Using the point estimates from the ﬁxed eﬀects model,
a reduction in the EPL index by 1.5 units, from the strict level in Portugal to the medium
level of Austria or Sweden, would increase the incidence of nominal wage cuts by a factor of
exp(−0.785(−1.5)) = 3.2. This would raise the incidence of wage cuts in Portugal from 0.7 per-
cent to 2.3 percent. Correspondingly, the incidence of wage cuts in Sweden would increase from
1.3 percent to 4.6 percent if EPL were reduced by 1.6 units to the UK level. A reduction in union
25density from 75 percent (as in Denmark and Finland) to 25 percent (as in Germany and the
Netherlands) is associated with an incidence rate which is 2.7 times higher (exp(−1.992(−0.5))).
For Denmark this implies an increase in the incidence rate from 1.7 to 4.6 percent. A reduction
in union density of 20 percentage points, as experienced in the UK from the late 1970s to the late
1990s, implies an increase in the incidence rate by a factor of 1.5.
We then investigate whether institutions aﬀect the extent of DNWR as measured by the aver-
age fraction of wage cuts realised (Y/b Y), by a Poisson regression of Yit normalised on the number
of simulated wage cuts b Yit. The results are presented in columns 3 (pooled) and 4 (ﬁxed eﬀects)
of Table 6. Note that in this case the restriction imposed by the Poisson regression relative to the
negative binomial regression is accepted easily; indeed the results are the same in the negative
binomial model for both speciﬁcations.8 Again, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of EPL, union
density and unemployment on the number of wage cuts, implying a positive eﬀect on the fraction
of wage cuts prevented.
Using the estimates from the pooled model, a reduction in the EPL index by 1.5 units would
raise the fraction of wage cuts realised by a factor of 1.2 (= exp(−0.126(−1.5))). In the case of
Sweden, this would imply an increase in the fraction of wage cuts realised from 52.8 to 63.8
percent, i.e. reducing the fraction of wage cuts prevented from 47.2 to 36.2 percent. Similarly, a
reduction in union density from 75 percent to 25 percent would raise the fraction of wage cuts
realised by a factor of 1.6 (= exp(−0.890(−0.5))); for Finland, the fraction of wage cuts realised
would increase from 33.8 to 52.7 percent.
We have also included other institutional variables: bargaining coverage, temporary employ-
ment, and indices of centralisation and coordination. Centralisation turned out to have a negative
sign in two of the four regressions in Table 6, and signiﬁcant at the ten percent level in the pooled
negative binomial regression. The other variables had no eﬀect.9 Adding a time trend in the
8The goodness-of-ﬁt test yields χ2(334) = 179.8.
9Regrettably, the data for institutional variables apply to the whole economy, and not to the industry sector. As
variation in for example density or coverage in other parts of the economy would aﬀect the density and coverage
26regressions in Table 6 gave positive signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in the models for the incidence of
wage cuts, but not in the models for the fraction of wage cuts realised. The trend coeﬃcient
in the ﬁxed eﬀects model is 0.065, implying that the predicted change in the incidence of wage
cuts over a period of 27 years is an increase by a factor of 5.8 (= exp(0.065(27))). The overall
increase was, however, much greater; as shown in Table 1, the incidence of wage cuts increased
from 0.23 percent in the 1970s to 9.15 percent in the late 1990s. Overall, these results indicate
that the reduction in DNWR over time (as measured by the fraction of wage cuts prevented) is
explained by the evolution of the economic and institutional variables, while there may have
been an additional reduction over time in the incidence of wage cuts.
6 Conclusions
This paper explores the existence of downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) in the manufac-
turing, mining and quarrying, electricity, gas and water supply, and construction sectors of 19
OECD countries, over the period 1973–1999, using data for hourly nominal wages at industry
level. Based on a novel nonparametric statistical method, which allows for country and year
speciﬁc variation in both the median and the dispersion of industry wage changes, we reject the
hypothesis of no DNWR for the total sample. Splitting into subsamples, we document the exist-
ence of DNWR for the high inﬂation period 1973–1989, as well as for the low inﬂation periods
1990–1994 and 1995–1999. Furthermore, we also ﬁnd evidence for DNWR for groups of coun-
tries: the South (Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain), the Core (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany,
Luxembourg, Netherlands), the Nordic region (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden). For the
group of native English speaking countries, Anglo (Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the UK and
the US), we ﬁnd less DNWR, but nevertheless signiﬁcant at the ten percent level. Dividing further
into individual countries, DNWR is statistically signiﬁcant only for some of the countries: for the
variable, but presumably not aﬀect wage setting in the industry sector, the estimates of these variables might be biased
downwards.
27Netherlands and Portugal at the ﬁve percent level, and Austria, Belgium, Italy and Sweden at the
ten percent level. The point estimates indicate some DNWR also for the other countries, with the
exception of Canada, France and Spain, but these results are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Interestingly, our results show that overall, the fraction of notional wage cuts that do not
result in observed wage cuts has fallen over time. The simulations indicate that for all countries
together, the fraction of wage cuts prevented by DNWR has fallen from 70 percent in the 1970s to
11 percent in the late 1990s. The Nordic countries appear to be an exception; for this group, the
fraction of wage cuts prevented is highest in the late 1990s. On the other hand, as inﬂation has
fallen over time, the fraction of industry-years aﬀected by DNWR has increased from less than
0.5 percent in the 1970s, to 1.2 percent in the late 1990s.
To explore the robustness of our ﬁndings, we perform our method with various types of
‘contaminated’ data. First, we add additional DNWR for ten of the countries, by randomly elim-
inating 50 percent of the observed wage cuts for these countries by setting the wage growth to
zero. Performing our method on the contaminated data, we are able to detect 92 percent of the
added DNWR, varying from 78 to 99 percent for the individual countries. The results for the
other countries for which we have not added DNWR are hardly aﬀected. This indicates that our
method does a very good job in detecting the DNWR that exists in the data. Secondly, we add
a considerable amount of downward real wage rigidity, DRWR, by eliminating 20 percent of all
real wage cuts by setting the nominal wage increase equal to the rate of inﬂation. This reduces the
number of nominal wage cuts by 18 percent, yet it has a rather limited eﬀect on our results, as the
fraction of wage cuts prevented only increases by six percentage points, from 22 to 28 percent.
In view of the fact that about 30 percent of all our observations are real wage cuts, it seems hard
to imagine stronger real wage rigidity than 20 percent. Thus, we conclude that DRWR, if it exists,
can only explain a minor part of our ﬁndings.
We then proceed to explore whether the extent of DNWR can be explained by economic
28and institutional variables. As predicted by the theoretical framework of Holden (2004), we
ﬁnd that both strictness of employment protection legislation and union density lead to stronger
DNWR: in country-year samples with strict employment protection legislation and high union
density, the number of observed wage cuts is signiﬁcantly reduced both relative to the number
of simulated, notional wage cuts and relative to the number of observations. High inﬂation also
leads to a lower incidence of wage cuts. The eﬀect of the institutional variables is fairly strong.
For example, weakening the employment protection legislation from a strict to a medium level,
would, according to the point estimates, raise the incidence of nominal wage cuts in Portugal
from 0.7 to 2.3 percent. A similar change in the employment protection legislation in Sweden,
from its current medium level down to the less strict level of the UK, would imply an increase in
the fraction of wage cuts realised from 52.8 to 63.8 percent, i.e. reducing the fraction of wage cuts
prevented from 47.2 to 36.2 percent. The evolution of the economic and institutional variables
can explain the reduction in DNWR over time.
Our study should be seen as complementary to the increasing number of empirical studies on
the existence of DNWR based in individual data. In general, we ﬁnd weaker evidence of DNWR
than several recent microstudies. This is consistent with the ﬁnding of Wilson (1999) who detect
notably less downward wage rigidity for job averages than for individuals. It is also consistent
with Card and Hyslop (1997), who ﬁnd evidence of DNWR on US microdata, but inconclusive
evidence for state level data. It is diﬃcult to know whether the weaker evidence only reﬂects
that we detect less of the rigidity that prevails at individual level, or whether it also reﬂects that
DNWR at individual or ﬁrm level is circumvented by employment being shifted over from high-
wage to low-wage jobs. In either case, our ﬁnding of DNWR yields clear additional support to
the idea that DNWR does aﬀect ﬁrms’ wage costs in many OECD countries, especially in Europe.
However, the quantitative eﬀect seem moderate.
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A Data appendix
We have obtained wage data from Eurostat for all countries except Austria, Finland, Norway and
Sweden (see below). The precise source is Table HMWHOUR in the Harmonized earnings domain
of under the Population and Social Conditions theme in the NEWCRONOS database. Our wage
variable (HMWHOUR) is labelled Gross hourly earnings of manual workers in industry. Gross earnings
cover remuneration in cash paid directly and regularly by the employer at the time of each
wage payment, before tax deductions and social security contributions payable by wage earners
and retained by the employer. Payments for leave, public holidays, and other paid individual
absences, are included in principle, in so far as the corresponding days or hours are also taken
into account to calculate earnings per unit of time. The weekly hours of work are those in a
normal week’s work (i.e. not including public holidays) during the reference period (October
or last quarter). These hours are calculated on the basis of the number of hours paid, including
overtime hours paid. Furthermore, we use data in national currency and males and females are
both included in the data. The data for Germany does not include GDR before 1990 or new
Länder.
The data are recorded by classiﬁcation of economic activities (NACE Rev. 1). The sections
represented are Mining and quarrying (C), Manufacturing (D), Electricity, gas and water supply
(E) and Construction (F). We use data on various levels of aggregation from the section levels
(e.g. D Manufacturing) to group levels (e.g. DA 159 Manufacturing of beverages), however,
using the most disaggregate level available in order to maximize the number of observations. If
for example, wage data are available for D, DA 158 and DA 159, we use the latter two only to
avoid counting the same observations twice.
Wage data for Austria, Finland and Sweden are from Table 5B ‘Wages in manufacturing’ in
LABORSTA, the Labour Statistics Database, ILO. The data are recorded by ISIC, Three digit
level covering the same sectors as the Eurostat data. Wage data for Norway are from Table
210 National Accounts 1970–2003, Statistics Norway, recorded by NACE Rev. 1. The sections
represented are the same as for the Eurostat data.
The average number of observations per country-year sample is 20.5, with a standard error
of 4.7. The distribution of the number of wage cuts relative to the number of observations on
years and countries are reported in Table A1.
We have removed ten extreme observations from the sample.
Data for inﬂation and unemployment are from the OECD Economic Outlook database.
The primary sources for the employment protection legislation (EPL) index, which is dis-
played in Table A2, are OECD (2004) for the 1980–1999 period and Lazear (1990) for the years
before 1980. We follow the same procedure as Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) to construct time-
varying series which is to use the OECD summary measure in the ‘Late 1980s’ for 1980–89 and
the ‘Late 1990s’ for 1995–99. For 1990-94 we interpolate the series. For 1973–79 the percentage
32change in Lazear’s index is used to back-cast the OECD measure. However, we are not able to
reconstruct the Blanchard and Wolfers data exactly.
Data for union density is from OECD. Data for Greece for 1978 and 1979 are interpolated
while data before 1977 is extrapolated at the 1977 level.
Data for bargaining coverage is from OECD (2004, Table 3.5) which provide data for 1980,
1990 and 2000. Data for the intervening years are calculated by interpolation while the obser-
vations for 1980 are extrapolated backwards. Data for Greece and Ireland is only available for
1994 from ILO (1997, Table 1.2). This observation is extrapolated for the entire period.
The incidence of temporary employment is deﬁned as the fraction of temporary to total
employment. Data from 1983 is from OECD’s Corporate Data Environment, Table Employment by
permanency of the (main) job. Data for Finland 1995 and 1996 and Norway are from Eurostat. Data
for Sweden are provided by the Statistics Sweden (SCB). Lacking information prior to 1983, we



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34Table A2: Indices for employment protection legislation, EPL
Year AT BE CA DE DK ES FI FR GR IE IT NL NO NZ PT SW UK US
1973 1.32 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 4.00 2.30 2.44 3.60 0.76 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 3.17 2.57 0.56 0.20
1974 1.39 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 4.00 2.30 2.57 3.60 0.83 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 3.43 3.03 0.58 0.20
1975 1.47 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 4.00 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 3.68 3.50 0.60 0.20
1976 1.61 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 3.96 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 3.76 3.50 0.60 0.20
1977 1.76 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 3.92 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 3.85 3.50 0.60 0.20
1978 1.91 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 3.88 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 3.93 3.50 0.60 0.20
1979 2.05 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 3.84 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 4.02 3.50 0.60 0.20
1980 2.20 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 3.80 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 4.10 3.50 0.60 0.20
1981 2.20 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 3.80 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 4.10 3.50 0.60 0.20
1982 2.20 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 3.80 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 4.10 3.50 0.60 0.20
1983 2.20 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 3.80 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 4.10 3.50 0.60 0.20
1984 2.20 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 3.80 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 4.10 3.50 0.60 0.20
1985 2.20 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 3.80 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 4.10 3.50 0.60 0.20
1986 2.20 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 3.80 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 4.10 3.50 0.60 0.20
1987 2.20 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 3.80 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 4.10 3.50 0.60 0.20
1988 2.20 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 3.80 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 4.10 3.50 0.60 0.20
1989 2.20 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 3.80 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 4.10 3.50 0.60 0.20
1990 2.20 3.03 0.80 3.08 2.15 3.65 2.27 2.75 3.58 0.90 3.45 2.60 2.87 0.90 4.03 3.28 0.60 0.20
1991 2.20 2.87 0.80 2.97 2.00 3.50 2.23 2.80 3.57 0.90 3.30 2.50 2.83 0.90 3.97 3.07 0.60 0.20
1992 2.20 2.70 0.80 2.85 1.85 3.35 2.20 2.85 3.55 0.90 3.15 2.40 2.80 0.90 3.90 2.85 0.60 0.20
1993 2.20 2.53 0.80 2.73 1.70 3.20 2.17 2.90 3.53 0.90 3.00 2.30 2.77 0.90 3.83 2.63 0.60 0.20
1994 2.20 2.37 0.80 2.62 1.55 3.05 2.13 2.95 3.52 0.90 2.85 2.20 2.73 0.90 3.77 2.42 0.60 0.20
1995 2.20 2.20 0.80 2.50 1.40 2.90 2.10 3.00 3.50 0.90 2.70 2.10 2.70 0.90 3.70 2.20 0.60 0.20
1996 2.20 2.20 0.80 2.50 1.40 2.90 2.10 3.00 3.50 0.90 2.70 2.10 2.70 0.90 3.70 2.20 0.60 0.20
1997 2.20 2.20 0.80 2.50 1.40 2.90 2.10 3.00 3.50 0.90 2.70 2.10 2.70 0.90 3.70 2.20 0.60 0.20
1998 2.20 2.20 0.80 2.50 1.40 2.90 2.10 3.00 3.50 0.90 2.70 2.10 2.70 0.90 3.70 2.20 0.60 0.20
1999 2.20 2.20 0.80 2.50 1.40 2.90 2.10 3.00 3.50 0.90 2.70 2.10 2.70 0.90 3.70 2.20 0.60 0.20
Table A3: Trade union density, percent
Year AT BE CA DE DK ES FI FR GR IE IT LU NL NO NZ PT SW UK US
1973 60.8 47.6 34.60 32.4 62.2 61.4 22.1 35.8 53.3 43.3 45.0 36.2 53.2 58.18 72.5 45.5 23.50
1974 57.9 49.0 35.00 33.7 65.2 63.2 21.7 35.8 53.9 46.2 45.6 36.0 54.1 59.12 73.5 46.4 23.20
1975 59.0 51.8 36.30 34.6 68.9 65.3 22.2 35.8 55.3 48.0 45.7 37.8 53.8 60.06 74.5 48.3 21.60
1976 59.2 52.6 35.70 35.1 73.0 67.6 21.4 35.8 56.3 50.5 46.7 37.1 52.8 61.00 73.9 49.4 21.60
1977 58.6 53.5 36.50 35.2 74.1 66.4 21.4 35.8 57.0 49.8 47.7 37.2 53.6 63.67 76.0 51.1 23.20
1978 57.6 53.1 36.00 35.5 77.8 66.9 20.7 36.9 57.6 50.4 48.9 37.0 54.0 66.33 60.8 77.0 51.8 22.40
1979 56.7 53.8 35.10 35.3 77.1 68.1 19.2 37.9 57.5 49.7 49.4 36.6 55.5 69.00 60.2 77.3 51.6 23.40
1980 56.7 54.1 34.90 34.9 78.6 69.4 18.3 39.0 57.1 49.6 50.8 35.3 58.3 69.10 59.7 78.0 50.7 22.30
1981 56.4 53.4 35.30 35.1 79.9 7.4 68.3 17.8 38.8 56.6 48.0 52.2 33.5 57.9 65.70 61.8 78.3 50.5 21.00
1982 53.8 52.1 35.80 35.0 80.2 8.4 68.4 17.0 38.4 56.1 46.7 52.5 32.8 58.1 65.10 61.1 78.9 48.7 20.25
1983 53.6 51.9 36.60 35.0 80.8 8.9 68.8 16.0 38.6 57.2 45.5 53.0 31.3 58.1 64.50 57.8 79.6 48.0 19.50
1984 52.1 52.0 34.70 34.9 79.3 8.6 69.0 14.9 38.0 57.0 45.3 53.0 30.0 58.3 59.50 56.3 80.8 47.5 18.20
1985 51.6 52.4 32.60 34.7 78.2 8.9 69.1 13.6 37.5 54.2 42.5 52.3 28.7 57.5 56.00 54.6 81.3 46.2 17.40
1986 50.6 51.5 33.00 33.9 77.4 8.6 70.0 12.5 37.2 51.6 40.4 51.1 27.3 57.1 54.10 51.4 82.5 44.8 17.00
1987 49.6 51.6 32.90 33.3 75.0 9.1 70.7 11.9 36.3 50.2 40.0 49.8 24.9 55.7 52.80 47.7 82.4 44.5 16.50
1988 48.9 51.4 34.30 33.1 73.8 9.6 72.3 11.2 34.9 50.5 39.8 48.1 24.7 56.1 54.20 42.3 81.4 42.6 16.20
1989 48.0 52.4 33.00 32.4 75.6 10.0 73.0 10.7 33.7 51.8 39.4 46.1 25.1 58.0 55.10 37.6 80.7 40.6 15.90
1990 46.9 53.9 32.90 31.2 75.3 11.0 72.3 10.1 32.4 51.1 38.8 44.7 25.5 58.5 51.00 31.7 80.0 39.3 15.50
1991 45.5 54.3 35.30 36.0 75.8 14.7 74.4 10.0 32.4 51.2 38.7 42.6 25.6 58.1 44.40 31.5 80.1 38.5 15.50
1992 44.3 54.3 33.10 33.9 75.8 16.5 76.8 10.2 32.0 51.3 38.9 41.5 25.2 58.1 37.10 29.0 82.9 37.2 15.10
1993 43.2 55.0 32.80 31.8 77.3 18.0 78.8 10.1 31.1 50.0 39.2 40.7 25.9 58.0 34.50 28.6 83.9 36.1 15.10
1994 41.4 54.7 34.20 30.4 77.5 17.6 78.0 10.0 30.3 48.6 38.7 39.6 25.6 57.8 30.20 27.3 83.7 34.2 14.90
1995 41.1 55.7 33.80 29.2 77.0 16.3 79.2 9.8 29.6 47.1 38.1 38.6 25.7 57.3 27.60 25.4 83.1 34.1 14.30
1996 40.1 55.9 34.00 27.8 77.4 16.1 78.8 9.8 28.9 45.4 37.4 38.4 25.1 56.3 24.90 24.8 82.7 33.2 14.00
1997 38.9 56.0 28.80 27.0 75.6 15.7 79.4 9.8 28.6 44.4 36.2 38.0 25.1 55.5 23.60 24.3 82.2 32.1 13.60
1998 38.4 55.4 28.50 25.9 76.8 14.9 77.7 9.8 26.7 42.4 35.7 37.4 24.5 55.5 22.30 23.3 81.3 31.5 13.40
1999 37.4 55.1 27.90 25.6 76.3 14.5 77.4 9.8 26.1 40.6 36.1 35.7 24.6 54.8 21.90 23.5 80.6 31.4 13.40
35Table A4: Indices for bargaining coverage
Year AT BE CA DE DK ES FI FR GR IE IT NL NO NZ PT SW UK US
1973 95.0 90.0 37.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 90.0 80.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 70.0 26.0
1974 95.0 90.0 37.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 90.0 80.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 70.0 26.0
1975 95.0 90.0 37.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 90.0 80.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 70.0 26.0
1976 95.0 90.0 37.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 90.0 80.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 70.0 26.0
1977 95.0 90.0 37.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 90.0 80.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 70.0 26.0
1978 95.0 90.0 37.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 90.0 80.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 70.0 26.0
1979 95.0 90.0 37.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 90.0 80.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 70.0 26.0
1980 95.0 90.0 37.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 90.0 80.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 70.0 26.0
1981 95.0 90.0 37.1 80.0 70.0 61.0 90.0 81.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 67.0 25.2
1982 95.0 90.0 37.2 80.0 70.0 62.0 90.0 82.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 64.0 24.4
1983 95.0 90.0 37.3 80.0 70.0 63.0 90.0 83.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 61.0 23.6
1984 95.0 90.0 37.4 80.0 70.0 64.0 90.0 84.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 58.0 22.8
1985 95.0 90.0 37.5 80.0 70.0 65.0 90.0 85.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 55.0 22.0
1986 95.0 90.0 37.6 80.0 70.0 66.0 90.0 86.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 52.0 21.2
1987 95.0 90.0 37.7 80.0 70.0 67.0 90.0 87.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 49.0 20.4
1988 95.0 90.0 37.8 80.0 70.0 68.0 90.0 88.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 46.0 19.6
1989 95.0 90.0 37.9 80.0 70.0 69.0 90.0 89.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 43.0 18.8
1990 95.0 90.0 38.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 40.0 18.0
1991 95.0 90.0 37.4 78.8 71.0 71.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 71.0 70.0 56.5 71.0 81.0 39.0 17.6
1992 95.0 90.0 36.8 77.6 72.0 72.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 72.0 70.0 53.0 72.0 82.0 38.0 17.2
1993 95.0 90.0 36.2 76.4 73.0 73.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 73.0 70.0 49.5 73.0 83.0 37.0 16.8
1994 95.0 90.0 35.6 75.2 74.0 74.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 74.0 70.0 46.0 74.0 84.0 36.0 16.4
1995 95.0 90.0 35.0 74.0 75.0 75.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 75.0 70.0 42.5 75.0 85.0 35.0 16.0
1996 95.0 90.0 34.4 72.8 76.0 76.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 76.0 70.0 39.0 76.0 86.0 34.0 15.6
1997 95.0 90.0 33.8 71.6 77.0 77.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 77.0 70.0 35.5 77.0 87.0 33.0 15.2
1998 95.0 90.0 33.2 70.4 78.0 78.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 78.0 70.0 32.0 78.0 88.0 32.0 14.8
1999 95.0 90.0 32.6 69.2 79.0 79.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 79.0 70.0 28.5 79.0 89.0 31.0 14.4
Table A5: Indices of centralisation
Year AT BE CA DE DK ES FI FR IE IT NL NO NZ PT SW UK US
1973 3.0 4.0 1.0 3.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 1.0
1974 3.0 4.0 1.0 3.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 1.0
1975 3.0 3.5 1.0 3.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 1.0
1976 3.0 3.5 1.0 3.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 1.0
1977 3.0 3.5 1.0 3.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 1.0
1978 3.0 3.5 1.0 3.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 1.0
1979 3.0 3.5 1.0 3.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 1.0
1980 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 1.0
1981 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 1.0
1982 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 1.0
1983 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 1.0
1984 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 1.0
1985 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 5.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1986 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 5.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1987 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 5.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1988 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 5.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1989 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 5.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1990 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1991 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1992 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1993 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1994 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1995 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1996 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1997 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1998 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1999 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
36B Results with country and period speciﬁc underlying distribu-
tions
Table B1: Results with country and period speciﬁc underlying distributions. Country speciﬁc distributions are based on
observations from the high inﬂation years 1973–92. The period speciﬁc underlying distributions are based on observations
from the periods 1973–79, 1980–89, 1990–94 and 1995–1999 respectively. Otherwise the method is as in the main
text.
Country speciﬁc underlying distributions Period speciﬁc underlying distributions
Category Y b Y #(b y > yB) p FWCP FIYA Y b Y #(b y > yB) p FWCP FIYA
All 324 409 4996 0.001 0.208 0.009 324 425 5000 0.000 0.238 0.011
1970–79 5 16 4918 0.016 0.683 0.005 5 16 4952 0.010 0.692 0.005
1980–89 74 109 4960 0.008 0.325 0.010 74 109 4977 0.005 0.326 0.010
1990–94 93 115 4665 0.067 0.192 0.012 93 121 4913 0.017 0.232 0.015
1995–99 152 169 4125 0.175 0.097 0.010 152 178 4779 0.044 0.146 0.016
British Isles 153 167 3917 0.217 0.084 0.005 153 179 4707 0.059 0.146 0.009
Core 125 155 4806 0.039 0.193 0.010 125 160 4961 0.008 0.220 0.011
Nordic 18 32 4828 0.034 0.439 0.007 18 36 4961 0.008 0.502 0.009
South 28 55 4986 0.003 0.491 0.018 28 50 4958 0.008 0.434 0.015
Austria 2 5 3861 0.228 0.571 0.006 2 8 4765 0.047 0.739 0.014
Belgium 31 37 3871 0.226 0.162 0.010 31 41 4679 0.064 0.247 0.018
Canada 57 57 2433 0.513 0.007 0.001 57 58 2543 0.491 0.013 0.001
Germany 16 18 2973 0.405 0.121 0.003 16 18 2827 0.435 0.085 0.002
Denmark 8 12 3837 0.233 0.342 0.009 8 14 4267 0.147 0.414 0.012
Finland 2 3 2573 0.485 0.278 0.002 2 6 4466 0.107 0.673 0.011
France 21 22 2539 0.492 0.032 0.001 21 18 1361 0.728 –0.148 –0.005
Greece 7 12 4170 0.166 0.426 0.011 7 8 2537 0.493 0.094 0.002
Ireland 27 33 3707 0.259 0.188 0.013 27 36 4310 0.138 0.251 0.020
Italy 0 3 4711 0.058 1.000 0.011 0 3 4601 0.080 1.000 0.009
Luxembourg 32 39 3763 0.247 0.174 0.016 32 41 4324 0.135 0.215 0.021
Netherlands 23 35 4607 0.079 0.334 0.024 23 35 4799 0.040 0.341 0.025
New Zealand 45 51 3699 0.260 0.123 0.008 45 55 4172 0.166 0.176 0.013
Norway 2 6 4252 0.150 0.643 0.005 2 5 3901 0.220 0.570 0.004
Portugal 3 21 4996 0.001 0.854 0.043 3 21 5000 0.000 0.859 0.044
Spain 18 19 2548 0.490 0.042 0.003 18 18 2072 0.586 –0.027 –0.002
Sweden 6 12 4453 0.109 0.481 0.012 6 12 4626 0.075 0.490 0.012
UK 18 21 3214 0.357 0.135 0.005 18 22 3770 0.246 0.186 0.007
US 6 4 1231 0.754 -0.387 -0.003 6 9 3510 0.298 0.304 0.005
Notes: see Table 1
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